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Calibration of the Impact Errors due to G fc G Uncertainties in the
Minuteman R &: D Test Program at the Eastern Test Range
A. N. Drucher
TRW

Los Angeles, Calif..

It became evident a little over a year ago that errors in our knowledge of the
force field acting on a ballistic missile in free flight and errors in our knowledge of
target location, the so-called geodetic and geophysical (G & G) errors, constitute two
of the principal error sources in the Minuteman R & D test program on the Eastern Test
Range. We found that individually-measured subsystem miss contributions, when added
together on a given flight, would not fully account for the weapon system impact miss
derived from the splash net; in other words, we were always left with a significant
impact error which could not be attributed to guidance system, control system, propul
sion system, separation dynamics, re-entry vehicle, or instrumentation system errors.
It was concluded that this remanent error could only arise from either an inaccurately
modelled force field in the targeting equations and/or from errors in our assumed
knowledge of the target location.
Although new geodetic survey information for Ascension Island and Improved world
gravimetric data became available last year from data gathered in the Transit, Anna,
SECOR, and other satellite programs, no comprehensive approach had been developed for
using these data systems or other schemes for accurately calibrating the total miss
contribution due to G & G errors along the Minuteman R & D test trajectory on a flight
from Cape Kennedy to the Ascension impact area, TRW Systems investigated the adequacy
of the then existing and upcoming satellite programs (such as GEOS and the Calibration
Satellite) and ground-based geodetic programs for determining the total G & G impact
effect on the Eastern Test Range. It was concluded that the n..st accurate, quickest,
and least expensive way to measure the combined G % G error, for the special case of a
Minuteman trajectory to Ascension, was to use the existing radar network tracking the
Minuteman vehicle .itself.

The Minuteman program, therefore, embarked on its own

limited special-purpose G & G measurement program,,
Three Minuteman flights were programmed with special G & G evaluation flight test
This program consisted of two phases. Phase I with two Minuteman flights
was aimed at obtaining the total G & G error along the Minuteman trajectory to Ascen
objectives.
sion.

-This phase has been successfully completed . The derived error was in close
agreement on both flights and was consistent with the magnitude of the previously un
accountable impact errors observed on the other flights in the R & D test program. A

probable cause for this error has been postulated which assumes that it results pri
marily from insufficient terms being carried in the WGS I960 gravity field harmonic
used in the Minuteman targeting equations.
*

Dr. Drucher 's paper was delayed beyond press time so we have substituted a
summary therof. __Ed.
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Because of the geometrical constraint imposed by the trajectory on these two
flights, it was not possible to completely separate the gravity field errors and the
Ascension geodetic survey error out of the total derived G & G error. In order to
verify that the effect on a Minuteman impact of the Ascension survey error is small
compared with the effect of the gravity-error, a special trajectory was chosen for a
third Minuteman flight which makes possible the complete separation of these two types*
of errors. This constitutes Phase II of the program, consisting of one missile flight.
A description of the technical approach for these two phases of the R & D Minuteman
G & G calibration pro gram follows.
In Phase I, the vehicles were programmed to fly into an impact area approximately
4600 nautical.miles from the launch area in the vicinity of Ascension Island. Mo
instrumentation changes or any other modifications were made to the Minuteman vehicles
themselves. The trajectory chosen for these tests departed only slightly from the
flight paths followed by conventionally-targeted R & D flights in that an impact was
selected in the broad ocean area about 100 miles beyond Ascension instead of using the
standard target point in the Splash Net, about 25 miles off Ascension. The reason for
this target selection will b'e discussed/shortly. Special efforts were made on these
flights to obtain the highest possible quality of tracking coverage of the re-entry
vehicles during their ballistic flight, using the Range's C-band metric radars.
The technique and its rationale for using missile flights to evaluate the total
G & G error is as follows. If we have available a radar or a network of radars track
ing the re-entry vehicle after it has been separated from the booster, then we can
estimate the initial position and velocity vector of the vehicle at the time that it
enters its ballistic flight. This initial condition vector is expressed in some con
venient coordinate frame, such as, let us say, the WGS I960 earth fixed coordinates.
We can now take this vector and compute a ballistic trajectory from it, using the tar
geted equations of motion. If we also use the targeted re-entry vehicle and atmospheric
characteristics to compute the re-entry conditions, then the point where this computed
trajectory intercepts our mathematical model of the earth will be our best estimate of
the impact point calculated from uprange data, given in the same coordinate frame
(WGS I960) used to describe the initial conditions. We can now separately compare this
calculated impact point with the targeted aim point and with the impact obtained from a
measurement of the actual splash pointo
We can easily see that the difference between the calculated impact point and the
targeted aim point represents the total effect on impact of all boost phase and
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-3separation phase errors such as the guidance, propulsion, controls, structural relaxa
tion, retro-rocket plume-induced errors, etc. plus any errors in the uprange radars.
Notice this difference in impacts does not include the effect of any G & G errors,
except those occurring prior to free flight which are normally lumped in with the
guidance errors.
If, on the other hand, we compare the above-calculated impact point (derived from
uprange free flight data) with the actual impact point as measured from an impact loca
tion system, then any difference between these two points can only be caused by one or
a combination of the following errors:
a.

Errors in the measurement of the initial condition vector due to errors in
the uprange radar.

b.

Deviations of the actual force field acting on the vehicle from the force
field assumed in the targeted equations of motion (i.e., the gravimetric
error).

c.

Errors in the survey of the downrange impact location system arising some
where in the process of relating the position of the downrange site to the
origin of the uprange (WGS I960)-coordinate frame (i.e., the geodetic error).

d.

Measurement (or instrumentation) errors in the downrange impact location
system.

e.

Deviations of the actual flight path of the vehicle during re-entry from the
targeted flight path due to errors in estimating R/V and/or atmospheric
parameters.

We see that in order to isolate the effect of the G & G errors from the total
error derived by differencing the uprange-extrapolated impact point with the measured
jjnpact point, we must in some ivay separately evaluate the uprange and downrange instru
mentation errors and the re-entry errors.
We can eliminate consideration of the re-entry errors by making our downrange
measurements prior to re-entry. This is done by substituting a downrange radar or net
work of radars for the impact location network. This has the added advantage that it
provides additional trajectory planning flexibility in that the re-entry vehicle is no
longer constrained to impact in a rather limited instrumented splash net area but can
be targeted to impact anywhere in a very broad area as long as its incoming trajectory
is within range of the downrange radars The data from the downrange radars is used in the same manner as the data from the
— to obtain an initial condition position and velocity vector for the
vehicle — except that in this case the initial condition vector applies to the

uprange radars
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-4begir-niLrr: of re-entry. This vector is now extrapolated to impact by using the targeted
drag characteristics and re-entry equations. If this impact is compared with the actual
missile impact, any difference will be due to the re-entry errors or radar and impact
location system errors. If on the other hand this impact, based on the downrange radar
data taken prior to re-entry, is compared with the impact calculated from the uprange
radar data, we find that both computed trajectories are independent of the actual re
entry path and hence will not reflect re-entry errors. Any difference between these
two impacts can only result from the following causes: measurement errors in the uprange
radars, measurement error in the downrange radars, errors in the targeted equations of
motion based on the assumed gravity field, and/or errors in the location of the downrange radars (and hence the downrange impact area) relative to the center of the up
range (WGS I960) coordinate frame * These latter two errors are the G & G errors of
interestThe relationship between the various impact errors is illustrated in the sketch on
the following page where the measurement errors in the various radars and other perti
nent instrumentation systems are assumed to be zero.
We see that in order to evaluate the total effect on impact of the G & G error on
the Minuteman trajectory, we need to organize the test so that either the effect of the
uprange and downrange radar errors on impact is small (compared with the G & G errors)
or the radar errors can be separately evaluated and removed from the data. Once the
uprange and downrange radar measurement errors have been eliminated then any difference
between the impact points derived from extrapolated uprange and extrapolated downrange
data will be due only to propagation of G & G errors into miss on the trajectory flown.
To effectively eliminate the systematic errors in the uprange radars' free flight
tracking data, the radar outputs can be compared with MTSTRA.M, UDOP< and inertial
guidance data during powered flight, Because of the very high accuracy of these latter
systems, any existing radar biases, lags, or timing errors causing measurement errors
greater than about 10 feet can be readily identified. Once these systematic errors are
known, they can be compensated out of the free flight radar data. Then, to derive an
accurate initial position and velocity vector for the vehicle in free flight, it only
remains to smooth a long enough span of radar data (usually 200 to 300 seconds) in
order to reduce the effect of the random errors in the data to a point where these have
a negligible effect on the computed impact.
Unfortunately, we have no accurate measurement standards such as MISTRAM, UDOP, or
the guidance system available in the terminal area for evaluating the systematic errors
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.Impact Error Breakdown on a Minutemail Flight Test
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-6in the downrange radars. However, with proper design of the trajectory, the radars
can be used to calibrate themselves. Therefore, a major effort in the Phase I flights
of the Minuteman special G & G measurement program at ETR was to plan the test so that
the vehicle flight path closely approximates the standard R & D test trajectory from
Cape Kennedy to Ascension and yet from the viewpoint of the downrange radars provides
sufficient dynamic exercise of the radar measurement channels to permit the identifica
tion and evaluation of any systematic errors which may be present. Specifically, a

trajectory was chosen so -that the vehicle is initially acquired
are looking uprange, then the vehicle flies by the radars prior
the atmosphere and impacts downrange of the radars. This large
metry permits the positive separation and subsequent removal of
from the data»

by the radars when they
to re-entry and re-enters
swing in tracking geo
bias and timing errors

To summarize what has been described above, the technique used in the Minuteman
Program to evaluate the effect on impact of the G & G error on a typical Kinuternan
trajectory is to measure the velocity and position vector of the actual missile in

.flight at both ends of the ballistic free flight trajectory, and individually extend
these vectors to impact using the targeted equations of motion. Assuming that special
care has been taken to eliminate errors in the radars used, to measure these uprange and
downrange free flight vectors, the difference between the"two calculated impacts
represents the effect of the total G & G uncertainties in the targeting,
The elegance, simplicity, and yet the great power of this technique becomes evi
dent when we consider that we come up directly with the desired answer, the total
G & G impact error contribution, i^ithout requiring any special effort to separate the
individual effects of the survey and the force field errors or to express these errors

in terms of fundamental geophysical quantities such as higher drder gravity harmonics,
the universal gravity constant, radius of the ea.rth, flattening, ellipsoidal model
terms, etc., which would subsequently have to be propagated into positional errors on
the Minuteman trajectory to compute their effect on Jmpact. Such an effort involves

a very difficult problem of unscrambling multi-dimensional cross-correlations in a very
large order regression analysis and requires huge amounts of data on different orbits
and inclinations to produce reasonably accurate answers; this type of analysis would

have to be employed in making use of satellite data to determine the G & G error on a
given Minuteman trajectory.

Obviously, for most targeted trajectories, we have no choice but to use satellite
data to improve our knowledge of G & G parameters, but on the ETR trajectory'we have
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-7the simple alternative of using the missile test itself. Actually, the technique
described in this paper is complementary to satellite G & G work already accomplished
in that having come up with a combined G & G error on the R & D trajectory, with the
errors evaluated on two special flights proving to be consistent with each other and
with past observations of the unaccountable error on a large number of Minuteman
flights, we can now attempt to correlate the combined G & G error with estimations .of
Ascension location and higher order gravity terms obtained from satellite data, Pre
liminary analysis indicates that most of the G & G error observed on ETR Minuteman
flights can be accounted for by changing the targeted equations of motion to include an
improved gravity model based on recent satellite data.
The survey error in the targeted location of Ascension appears to be negligible«
To further check on this result a special Minuteman flight, constituting Phase II of
the Minuteman G & G Flight Test Program, was planned. On this flight, the vehicle was
programmed to fly a highly lofted trajectory to the. Ascension area which would make
it simultaneously visible to all the radars on the Range, including those on Ascension
Island, for a period of at least 20 minutes, By inhibiting both thrust termination of
the third stage and separation of Lhe R./V and by providing for a period of stable
flight following third stage burnout, it should be possible to obtain a particularly
accurate calibration of the radar .errors from a long overlapping stretch of guidance,
MISTRAM, UDOP, and radar data in the relatively benign, near-free'flight environment
occurring during engine tailoff* With accurate radar data, we can use the intervisible
period in a multilateration solution to locate Ascension Island without making any use
of equation of motion constraints in the analysis, and hence without being influenced
by any errors in our knowledge of the gravity field. This flight, therefore, should
enable us to obtain an accurate 3 unambiguous separation between the gravimetric and
geodetic errors on the Ascension trajectory« The work in Phase II has not been com
pleted to date.
Details of the trajectories used in'Phase I and Phase II and plots of actual data
residuals showing the high quality of the radar data after bias calibration, will be
given in the final published version of the paper.
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